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This paper studies how stable over time are the so-called "structural parameters" of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models. To answer this question, we estimate a medium-scale DSGE
model with real and nominal rigidities using U.S. data. In our model, we allow for parameter drifting
and rational expectations of the agents with respect to this drift. We document that there is strong evidence
that parameters change within our sample. We illustrate variations in the parameters describing the
monetary policy reaction function and in the parameters characterizing the pricing behavior of firms
and households. Moreover, we show how the movements in the pricing parameters are correlated with













This paper studies the following problem: how stable over time are the so-called “structural
parameters” of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models? To answer this
question, we estimate a medium-scale DSGE model with real and nominal rigidities using U.S.
data. In our model, we allow for parameter drifting and rational expectations of the agents
with respect to this drift. We document that there is strong evidence that parameters change
within our sample. In particular, we illustrate variations in the parameters describing the
monetary policy reaction function and in the parameters characterizing the pricing behavior
of ﬁrms and households. Moreover, we show how the movements in the pricing parameters
are correlated with inﬂation. Thus, our results cast doubts on the empirical relevance of
Calvo models.
Our ﬁndings are important because DSGE models are at the core of modern macroeco-
nomics. They promise to be a laboratory that researchers can employ to match theory with
reality, to design economic policy, and to evaluate welfare. The allure of DSGE models has
captured the imaginations of many, inside and outside academia. In universities, a multitude
of economists implement DSGE models in their rich varieties and fashions. More remark-
able still, a burgeoning number of policy-making institutions are estimating DSGE models
for policy analysis and forecasting. The Federal Reserve Board (Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust,
2005), the European Central Bank (Christoﬀel, Coenen, and Warne, 2007), the Bank of
Canada (Murchison and Rennison, 2006), the Bank of Sweden (Adolfson et al., 2005), and
t h eB a n ko fS p a i n( A n d r é s ,B u r r i e la n dE s t r a d a ,2 0 0 6 )a r ea tt h ef r o n to ft h et i d e ,b u ta
dozen other institutions are jumping on the bandwagon. In addition, the profession is accu-
mulating experience with the good forecasting record of DSGE models, even when compared
with judgmental predictions from staﬀ economists (Laforte and Windle, 2006).
At the center of DSGE models, we have the “structural parameters” that deﬁne the
preferences and technology of the economy. We call these parameters “structural” in the
sense of Hurwicz (1962): they are invariant to interventions, including shocks by nature. The
structural character of the parameters is responsible for much of the appeal of DSGE models.
Since the parameters are fully interpretable from the perspective of economic theory and
invariant to policy interventions, DSGE models avoid the Lucas critiqueand can be used to
quantitatively evaluate policy.
O u rp o i n to fd e p a r t u r ei st h a t ,a tl e a s ta ts o m el e v e l ,i ti sh a r dt ob e l i e v et h a tt h e
“structural parameters” of DSGE models are really structural given the class of interventions
we are interested in for policy analysis. Let us think, for instance, about technology. Most
DSGE models specify a stable production function, perhaps subject to productivity growth.
3Except in a few papers (Young, 2004), the features of the technology, like the elasticity of
output to capital, are constant over time. But this constant elasticity is untenable in a world
where technological change is purposeful. We can expect that changes in the relative input
prices will induce changes in the new technologies developed and that those may translate
into diﬀerent elasticities of output to inputs. Similar arguments can be made along nearly
every dimension of a modern DSGE model.
T h ep r e v i o u sa r g u m e n ti sn o ts u ﬃcient to dismiss the practice of estimating DSGE models
with constant parameter values. Simplifying assumptions, like stable parameters, are required
to make progress in economics. However, as soon as we realize the possible changing nature
of “structural” parameters, we weaken the justiﬁcations for inference exercises underlying
the program of DSGE modeling. The separation between what is “structural” and what is
reduced-form becomes much more ambiguous.1
The possibility but not the necessity of parameter drifting motivates the main question of
this paper: how much evidence of parameter drifting in DSGE models is in the data? If the
answer is that we ﬁnd much support for drifting (where the metric to decide “much” needs
to be discussed), we would have to re-evaluate the usefulness of our estimation exercises or at
least modify them to account for parameter variation. Moreover, parameter drifting may also
be interpreted as a sign of model misspeciﬁcation and, possibly, as a guide for improving our
models. If the answer is negative, i.e., if we ﬁnd little parameter drifting, we would increase
our conﬁdence in DSGE models as a procedure to tackle relevant policy discussions.
Beyond addressing our substantive question, this paper also develops new tools for the
estimation of dynamic equilibrium models with parameter drifting. We show how the com-
bination of perturbation methods and the particle ﬁlter allows the eﬃcient estimation of this
class of economies. Indeed, all the required computations can be implemented in a standard
PC in a reasonable amount of time. We hope that those tools may be put to good use in other
applications, not necessarily in general equilibrium, that involve time-varying parameters in
essential ways.
Our main results are as follows. First, we oﬀer compelling proof of changing parameters in
the Fed’s behavior. Monetary policy became appreciably more aggressive in its stand against
inﬂation after Volcker’s appointment. This result agrees with Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(2000), Lubick and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin (2006), and Rabanal (2007). Our contribution
1Indeed, Hurwicz (1962) himself emphasized the contingency of the deﬁnition of structural parameters:
“...the concept of structure is relative to the domain of modiﬁcations anticipated”; “If two individuals diﬀer
with regard to modiﬁcations they are willing to consider, they will probably diﬀer with regard to the relations
accepted as structural,” and “...this relativity of the concept of structure is due to the fact that it represents
not a property of the material system under observation, but rather a property of the anticipations of those
asking for predictions concerning the state of the system” (italics in the original).
4is to re-derive the result within a model where agents understand and act upon the fact that
monetary policy changes over time.
Second, we expose the instability of the parameters controlling the level of nominal rigid-
ity and indexation of prices and wages. Those changes are strongly correlated with changes in
inﬂation in an intuitive way: lower rigidities correlate with higher inﬂation and higher rigidi-
ties with lower inﬂation. Our ﬁnding suggests that a more thorough treatment of nominal
rigidities, possibly through state-dependent pricing models, may yield a high payoﬀ.
We want to be up-front about the shortcomings of our exercise. First, and foremost, we
face the limitations of the data. With 184 quarterly observations of the U.S. economy, there
is a tight bound on how much we can learn from the data (Ploberger and Phillips, 2003,
frame the problem of empirical limits for time series models precisely in terms of information
bounds). The main consequence of the limitations of the short sample size is relatively
imprecise estimates.
The second limitation, forcefully emphasized by Sims (2001), is that we do not allow
for changing volatilities in the innovations of the model, which is itself a particular form
of parameter drift. If the innovations in the U.S. data are heteroskedastic (as we report
in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2007), the estimation may attempt to pick up
the changing variance by spurious changes in the structural parameters. At the same time,
Cogley and Sargent (2005) defend that there is still variation in the parameters of a VAR,
even after controlling for heteroskedasticity. We are currently working on an extension of the
model with both parameter drifting and changing volatilities.
In our work, we build upon an illustrious tradition of estimating models with parameter
drifting. One classic reference is Cooley and Prescott (1976), where the authors studied the
estimation of regression parameters that are subject to permanent and transitory shocks. Un-
fortunately, the techniques in this tradition are within the context of the Cowles Commission’s
framework and, hence, are of little direct application to our investigation.
Our paper is also linked with a growing body of research that shows signs of parameter
drifting on dynamic models. Since the estimation of this class of models is a new under-
taking, the evidence is scattered. One relevant literature estimates VARs with time-varying
parameters and/or stochastic volatility. Examples include Uhlig (1997), Bernanke and Mihov
(1988), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), and Sims and Zha (2006). The consen-
sus emerging from these papers is that there is evidence of time variation in the parameters
of a VAR, although there is a dispute about whether the variation comes from changes in
the autoregressive components or from stochastic volatility. This evidence, however, is only
suggestive, since a DSGE model with constant parameters may be compatible with a time-
varying VAR (Cogley and Sbordone, 2006).
5A second literature has estimated equilibrium models with parameter variation, but it has
been less ambitious in the extent of the ﬂuctuations studied. Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramírez (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) demonstrate the importance of stochastic
volatility to account for U.S. data using a DSGE model. King (2005) works with a simple RBC
economy with parameter drift in four parameters. However, his approach relies on particular
properties of his model and it is too cumbersome to be of general applicability. Canova
(2005) estimates a small scale New Keynesian model with parameter drifting but without the
agents being aware of these changes in the parameters. He uncovers important movements
in the parameters that enter into the Phillips curve and the Euler equations. Boivin (2006)
estimates a parameter-drifting Taylor rule with real-time data. He corroborates previous
ﬁndings of changes in the rule coeﬃcients obtained with ﬁnal data. Benati (2006), elaborating
on an argument by Woodford (2006), questions the indexation mechanisms introduced in New
Keynesian models and shows that they are not structural to changes in monetary policy rules.
Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel (1996) ﬁnd unstable parameters even in investment models
with more intricate representations of capital spending than those found in current DSGE
models. Owyang and Ramey (2004) estimate regime-switching models of monetary policy
and identify the evolving preferences of the monetary authority through their interaction with
the structural parameters.
There are also numerous papers that tell us about parameter drifting, albeit in an indirect
way. A common practice when estimating models has been to divide the sample into two
periods, usually before and after 1979, and argue that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
inference results. One celebrated representative of this method is Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(2000), a paper we will discuss later.
Finally, a literature that shares connections with our analysis is the one that deals with
DSGE models with a Markov-switching process in diﬀerent aspects of the environment, like
monetary or ﬁs c a lp o l i c y( D a v i ga n dL e e p e r ,2 0 0 6 aa n d2 0 0 6 b ,C h u n g ,D a v i g ,a n dL e e p e r ,
2006, and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha, 2006). The stated motivation of these papers is that
Markov switches help us understand the dynamics of the economy better. So far, none of
these papers has produced an estimated model.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. First, in section 2, we discuss diﬀerent ways
to think about parameter drifting in dynamic equilibrium models. In section 3, we develop
two simple examples of parameter drift that motivate our investigation. Section 4 spells out
a medium-scale model of the U.S. economy and discusses how to take this model to the data.
Section 5 introduces parameter drifting and explains how to adapt the approach in section 4
to handle this situation. We report our results in section 6. Section 7 concludes. An appendix
provides the interested reader with technical details.
62. Parameter Drifting and Dynamic Equilibrium Models
There are at least three ways to think about parameter drifting in an estimated DSGE model.
T h es i m p l e s ta p p r o a c h ,w h i c hw ec a l lt h ep u r eeconometric interpretation, is to consider
parameter drifting as a convenient phenomenon to ﬁt the data better or as the consequence
of a capricious nature that agents in the model neither understand nor forecast. Despite
its simplicity, this interpretation violates the spirit of rational expectations: not having free
parameters that the researcher can play with. Consequently, we will not investigate this case
further.
The second way to think about parameter drifting is as a characteristic of the environment
that the agents understand and act upon. Let us come back to our example of the production





t where output Yt is produced with capital Kt and labor Lt given a technology level
A and share parameter αt. The only diﬀerence with the standard environment is that αt is
indexed by time (neither the realism nor the empirical justiﬁcation of our example is crucial
for the argument, although we could argue in favor of both features). Let us also assume
that αt evolves over time as a random walk with reﬂecting boundaries at 0 and 1, to ensure
that the production function satisﬁes the usual properties. We could imagine that such drift
comes about because the new technologies developed have a random requirement of capital.
The solution of the agents’ problems are decision rules that have as one of their arguments
the current αt. Why? First, because αt determines current prices. Second, because αt helps
to forecast future values αt+j and hence to predict future prices. This interpretation is our
favorite one, and it will frame our reading of the results in section 6.
The ﬁnal perspective about parameter drifting is as a telltale of model misspeciﬁcation.
This point, raised by Cooley (1971) and Rosenberg (1968), is particularly cognate when
estimating DSGE models. These models are complex constructions. To make them useful for
policy purposes, researchers add many mechanisms that aﬀect the dynamics of the economy:
sticky prices and wages, adjustment costs, etc. In addition, DSGE models require tight
parametric assumptions for the utility function, the production function, the adjustment
costs, the distribution of shocks, etc. If we seriously misspeciﬁed the model along at least one
dimension, parameter drifting may appear as the only possibility left to the model to ﬁtt h e
data. Our example in section 3 illustrates this point in detail. We will exploit this possibility
in our empirical results and assess how the drift in the parameters determining the degree
of nominal rigidity in the economy implies that time-dependent models of pricing decisions
may be ﬂawed.
73. Two Examples
In this section, we present two simple examples that generate parameter drifting in estimated
DSGE models. We have chosen the examples to illustrate our points as clearly as possible
and not based on their relevance or plausibility. However, the examples are not far-fetched:
they deal with recurrent themes in the literature and are linked, albeit we do not explore this
connection to its fullest, to relevant features of the economy.
3.1. Parameter Drift as a Consequence of Changing Policies
The ﬁrst example deals with the changes in the elasticity of monetary policy to diﬀerent
variables. It is common to postulate that the monetary authority uses open market operations















The variable Π represents the target levels of inﬂation of the monetary authority, R the
steady-state gross return of capital, yt is output, and b yt a measure of target output. The
term εmt is a random shock distributed according to N(0,1).
In an inﬂuential contribution, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) drove the attention of
the profession to changes in the elasticity parameter γΠ before and after Volcker’s appoint-
ment as Fed chairman in 1979. They document, with a slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the
Taylor rule, that γΠ more than doubles after 1979. This ﬁnding has been corroborated in
many studies and found resilient to modiﬁcations in the empirical speciﬁcation (Lubick and
Schorfheide, 2004). The division of the sample between the time before and after 1979 has
also been exploited by Boivin and Giannoni (2006), who ﬁnd that the point estimates of the
structural parameters also substantially vary between the two periods.
Changes in the policy coeﬃcients are one particular example of parameter drift. They
can be the consequence of the shifting priorities of the policy-makers or, as emphasized by
Sargent (1999), of changes in the perception of the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. Once we
recognize that there is evidence of the parameter γΠ drifting over time, it is natural to assume
that agents are aware of the changes and act upon them. Such an environment may capture
some of the insights of Sims (1980) about the diﬀerence between a change in policy regime
(in our Taylor rule, a change in the way the interest rate is determined) and the evolution of
the policy within one regime, which could be represented in our context as the drift of the
parameters of the rule.
83.2. Parameter Drift as a Telltale of Model Misspeciﬁcation
Our second example revisits several of the themes in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).
We explore the consequences for inference of an econometrician estimating a model with
inﬁnitely lived agents when the data are actually generated by an overlapping generations
model. We show how our estimate of the discount factor will be a function of the true discount
factor, the elasticity of output to capital, and the changing age distribution of the population.
T h i se x a m p l ei sr e l e v a n tb e c a u s ev a r i a t i o n si nt h ea g es t r u c t u r eo ft h eU . S .p o p u l a t i o nh a v e
been continuous due to shifts in fertility and mortality.
3.2.1. An Artiﬁcial World
We begin by creating a simple artiﬁcial world. In each period t, there are two generations of
households alive, young and old. Each household maximizes the life utility
logc
t
t + βEt logc
t
t+1
where the superindex denotes that the household was born in period t, the subindex the
period in which it consumes, and Et is the conditional expectations operator. The discount
factor, β, captures the preference for current consumption. We pick a log utility function to
simplify the algebra below.
Households work when young and get a wage wt for a unit of time that they supply inelas-
tically. Households live oﬀ their savings when they are old. The period budget constraints
are ct
t + st = wt and ct
t+1 = Rt+1st,w h e r est is the household savings and Rt+1 the gross







In each period, a number nt of new households is born. For the moment, we will assume
only that lt is the realization of some random process. Nothing of substance for our argument
is lost by assuming that the size of the new generation is exogenous.




where kt is the total amount of capital in the economy and lt the total amount of labor. If
we assume total depreciation in the economy, again to simplify the algebra, and impose the
condition lt = nt, we get by competitive pricing wt =( 1− α)kα
t n
−α





Now, all that remains is some accounting. Total consumption in the economy in period
t, Ct, is equal to the consumption of the old generation plus the consumption of the young
generation. The old consume all of their income, which is equal to the capital income of the
economy, Rtkt = αkα
t n
1−α
t . The young consume a fraction 1
1+β of their income, which is equal
9to the labor income of the economy wtlt =( 1− α)kα
t n
1−α









By the aggregate resource constraint, investment (or, equivalently, capital in period t+1 )i s













Let us now suppose that we have an econometrician who aims to estimate a model with a
representative inﬁnitely lived agent and T observations generated from our economy. To do






















and γ0 =0 . This utility function is the same as in the canonical presentation of the RBC
model in Cooley and Prescott (1995) except that the growth rate of the population is sto-




t .T h u s ,t h eo n l yd i ﬀerence between the artiﬁc i a lw o r l dw eh a v ec r e a t e da n dt h e
model the econometrician estimates is that, instead of having two generations alive in each
moment, the econometrician estimates a model with a representative agent.
What are the consequences on the estimated parameters? Imagine that the econometrician
knows α and that the depreciation factor is 1. Then, a simple procedure to estimate the only

































We study how this expression evolves over time. First, note that, by substituting the
































We want to work on the previous expression. First, we substitute aggregate consumption
for its value in terms of capital and labor:



















The only remaining endogenous element in this equation is kt. To eliminate it, we recursively



































































which delivers a b βT, which is biased and drifts over time according to the evolution of the






and ﬁnally the term involving the nt’s and k0,w h i c hﬂuctuates over time.
11Without further structure on population growth over time, it is diﬃcult to say much about
b βT. In the simple case where γt = γ is constant, as T →∞ , the only factor dominating is:







To explore the behavior of b βT in the general case where γt varies, we simulate the model
and estimate the parameter recursively with data from an economy with α =0 .3 and β =0 .96.
T h eg r o w t hr a t e so fp o p u l a t i o na r e2 ,4 ,3 ,1 ,2 ,a n d5p e r c e n te a c hf o r5 0p e r i o d s( i . e . ,f o r
period 1 to 50, growth rate is 2 percent, for period 51 to 100, the growth rate is 4 percent
and so forth). We plot our results in ﬁgure 2.3.1, where we see the evolution over time of b βT
and how it inherits the properties of γt. To facilitate comparison with (1), we superimpose
the value of (1) that would be implied if the growth rate in a period stayed constant over
time. The graph shows how b βT converges to (1) within each block of 50 periods.
4 .T h eB a s e l i n eM o d e l
We will structure our investigation around a baseline New Keynesian business cycle model.
We pick this model because it is the paradigmatic representative of the DSGE economies
estimated by practitioners. Since on other occasions (Fernández-Villaverde, 2005), we have
gone on the record criticizing the problems of this framework, we do not feel obliged to repeat
those shortcomings here. Suﬃce it to say as a motivation that given the level of interest by
policy-making institutions in this model, it is diﬃcult to see a more appropriate vessel for
our exploration.
The New Keynesian model is well known (see the book-length description in Woodford,
2003). Consequently, we will be short in our presentation, and we will omit some of the tech-
nical aspects. On the other hand, for concreteness, we need to discuss the model in certain
detail. The interested reader can access the whole description of the model at a complemen-
tary technical appendix posted at www.econ.upenn.edu/~jesusfv/benchmark_DSGE.pdf.
In this section, to ﬁx ideas, we will introduce the model without changes in the parameters.
In section 5, we will introduce the parameter change over time.
4.1. Households
The basic structure of the economy is as follows. A representative household consumes, saves,
holds real money balances, supplies labor, and sets its own wages subject to a demand curve
and Calvo’s pricing. The ﬁnal output is manufactured by a competitive ﬁnal good producer,
12which uses as inputs a continuum of intermediate goods manufactured by monopolistic com-
petitors. The intermediate good producers rent capital and labor to manufacture their good.
Also, the intermediate good producers face the constraint that they can only change prices
following a Calvo’s rule. Finally, there is a monetary authority that ﬁxes the one-period
nominal interest rate through open market operations with public debt. Long-run growth
is induced by the presence of two unit roots, one in the level of neutral technology and one
in the investment-speciﬁc technology. These stochastic trends will allow us to estimate the
model with the raw, undetrended data.
We have a continuum of households in the economy indexed by j. The households maxi-
mize the following lifetime utility function, which is separable in consumption, cjt,r e a lm o n e y


















where β is the discount factor, h controls habit persistence, ϑ is the inverse of Frisch labor
supply elasticity, dt is a shock to intertemporal preference with the law of motion:
logdt = ρd logdt−1 + σdεd,t where εd,t ∼ N(0,1),
and ϕt is a labor supply shock with the law of motion:
logϕt = ρϕ logϕt−1 + σϕεϕ,t where εϕ,t ∼ N(0,1).
Households trade on the whole set of Arrow-Debreu securities, contingent on idiosyncratic
and aggregate events. Our notation ajt+1 indicates the amount of those securities that pay
one unit of consumption in event ωj,t+1,t purchased by household j at time t at (real) price
qjt+1,t. To save on notation, we drop the explicit dependence on the event. Households also
hold an amount bjt of government bonds that pay a nominal gross interest rate of Rt and
invest xt. Then, the j − th household’s budget constraint is:





















+ ajt + Tt + zt
where wjt is the real wage, rt the real rental price of capital, ujt > 0 the intensity of use of
capital, μ
−1
t Φ[ujt] is the physical cost of ujt in resource terms, μt is an investment-speciﬁc
13technological shock to be described momentarily, Tt is a lump-sum transfer, and zt is the
proﬁts of the ﬁrms in the economy. We assume that Φ[1] = 0, Φ0 and Φ00 > 0.
Investment xjt induces a law of motion for capital:








where δ is the depreciation rate and V [·] is a quadratic adjustment cost function such that
V [Λx]=0 ,w h e r eΛx i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fi n v e s t m e n ta l o n gt h eb a l a n c eg r o w t hp a t h .N o t e
that we index capital by the time its level is decided. The investment-speciﬁc technological
shock follows an autoregressive process:
μt = μt−1 exp(Λμ + zμ,t) where zμ,t = σμεμ,t and εμ,t ∼ N(0,1)
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to cjt, bjt, ujt, kjt,a n dxjt are:
dt (cjt − hcjt−1)

















































where λjt is the lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint and qjt is the
marginal Tobin’s Q, the lagrangrian multiplier associated with the investment adjustment
constraint normalized by λjt.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to labor and wages is more involved. The labor em-
ployed by intermediate good producers is supplied by a representative, competitive ﬁrm that
hires the labor supplied by each household j. The labor supplier aggregates the diﬀerentiated













where η controls the elasticity of substitution among diﬀerent types of labor and ld
t is the
aggregate labor demand.
14The labor “packer” maximizes proﬁts subject to the production function (2), taking as
























Households set their wages following a Calvo’s setting. In each period, a fraction 1−θw of
households reoptimize their wages. All other households can only partially index their wages
by past inﬂation. Indexation is controlled by the parameter χw ∈ [0,1]. This implies that if







Since we assume complete markets and separable utility in labor (see Erceg et al., 2000),
we will concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium where cjt = ct, ujt = ut, kjt−1 = kt, xjt = xt,
λjt = λt, qjt = qt,a n dw∗
jt = w∗
t. In anticipation of that equilibrium, and after a fair amount
















































that determine the evolution of wages.
Then, in every period, a fraction 1 − θw of households set w∗
t as their wage, while the













t−1 +( 1− θw)w
∗1−η
t .
154.2. The Final Good Producer














where ε controls the elasticity of substitution.
Final good producers are perfectly competitive and maximize proﬁts subject to the pro-
duction function (4), taking as given all intermediate goods prices pti and the ﬁnal good











t is the aggregate demand and the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o nptyd
t =
R 1










4.3. Intermediate Good Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate good producers. Each intermediate good producer i










where kit−1 is the capital rented by the ﬁrm, ld
it is the amount of the “packed” labor input
rented by the ﬁrm, the parameter φ corresponds to the ﬁxed cost of production, and where
At follows:
At = At−1 exp(ΛA + zA,t) where zA,t = σAεA,t and εA,t ∼ N(0,1)






t .W ec a nt h i n ko fzt as a weighted
index of the two technology levels At and μt, where the weight is the share of capital in the
production function. The product φzt guarantees that economic proﬁts are roughly equal
to zero in the steady state. Also, we rule out the entry and exit of intermediate good





1−α . We will see below that Λz is the mean growth rate of the economy.
Intermediate good producers solve a two-stage problem. First, given wt and rt,t h e yr e n t
16ld
it and kit−1 in perfectly competitive factor markets in order to minimize real costs, which













The marginal cost does not depend on i:a l lﬁrms receive the same shocks and rent inputs at
the same price.
Second, intermediate good producers choose the price that maximizes discounted real
proﬁts under the same pricing scheme as households. In each period, a fraction 1 − θp of
ﬁrms reoptimize their prices. All other ﬁrms can only index their prices by past inﬂation.
Indexation is controlled by the parameter χ ∈ [0,1],w h e r eχ =0is no indexation and χ =1
is total indexation.



































where the marginal value of a dollar to the household is treated as exogenous by the ﬁrm.
Since there are complete markets in securities, this marginal value is constant across house-
holds and, consequently, λt+τ/λt is the correct valuation on future proﬁts.





















































t−1 +( 1− θp)p
∗1−ε
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through open market operations that are ﬁnanced with lump-sum transfers Tt to ensure that
the government budget is balanced period by period. The variable Π represents the target
levels of inﬂation (equal to inﬂation in the steady state), R the steady-state gross return of
capital, and Λyd the steady-state gross growth rate of yd
t. With a bit of abuse of language,




t−1/Λyd as the growth gap.T h e t e r m mt is a random shock to
monetary policy that follows mt = σmεmt where εmt is distributed according to N(0,1).W e
introduce the previous period interest rate, Rt, to match the smooth proﬁle of the interest
rate over time observed in the U.S.
4.5. Aggregation
First, we begin with the aggregate demand:
y
d
t = ct + xt + μ
−1
t Φ[ut]kt−1
Then, using the production function for intermediate good producers, the fact that all the
ﬁrms pick the same capital-labor ratio, and market clearing in the output and input markets,
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18Finally, we integrate labor demand over all households j to obtain:
Z 1
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Ad e ﬁnition of equilibrium in this economy is standard and the equations that characterize
it are determined by the ﬁrst order conditions of the household, the ﬁrst order conditions of
the ﬁrms, the Taylor rule of the government, and market clearing.
To undertake our quantitative analysis, we must approximate the equilibrium dynamics
of the economy. Ours is a large model (even the version without parameter drifting has 19
state variables). Moreover, we will need to solve the model repeatedly during our estimation
process. We have argued elsewhere (Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramírez, and Santos, 2006)
that there is much to be gained from a nonlinear estimation of the model, both in terms of
accuracy and in terms of identiﬁc a t i o n .T h i si sp a r t i c u l a r l yt r u ei fw ew a n tt oa l l o wt h ea g e n t s
in the economy to insure themselves against future changes in the parameters of the model.
Hence, we require a nonlinear solution method that is fast and accurate. In previous work
(Aruoba, Fernández-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramírez, 2006), we have found that a second
order perturbation around the deterministic steady-state of the model fulﬁlls the previous
desiderata.
But before solving the model, we clear up some technical issues. First, because of techno-
logical change, most of the variables are growing in average. To achieve the right accuracy in
the computation, we make the variables stationary and solve the model in the transformed
variables. Hence, we deﬁne e ct = ct
zt, e λt = λtzt, e rt = rtμt, e qt = qtμt, e xt = xt
zt, e wt = wt





e kt = kt




zt .A l s on o t et h a tΛc = Λx = Λw = Λw∗ = Λyd = Λz. Second, we choose
functional forms for Φ[·] and V [·].F o r Φ[u] we pick Φ[u]=Φ1 (u − 1) + Φ2
2 (u − 1)2.W e
19normalize u =1in the steady state. Hence, e r = Φ0 [1] = Φ1 and Φ[1] = 0. The investment







xt−1 −Λx)2. Then, along the balanced growth path,
V [Λx]=V 0 [Λx]=0 .
We will perform our perturbation in logs. For each variable vart,w ed e ﬁne d vart =
logvart − logvar, as the log deviation with respect to the steady state. Then, the states of
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and the exogenous shocks are εt =( εμ,t,εd,t,εϕ,t,εA,t,εm,t)
0 .
As a ﬁrst step, we parameterize the matrix of variances-covariances of the exogenous
shocks as Ω(χ)=χΩ,w h e r eΩ(1) = Ω, is a diagonal matrix. However, nothing really depends
on that assumption, and we could handle an arbitrary matrix of variances-covariances. Then,
we take a perturbation solution around the deterministic steady state of the model, i.e., χ =0 .


















































is the quadratic component, and Ψs3
is a 1×24 vector of constants added by the second order approximation that corrects for
precautionary behavior. Some of the entries of the matrices Ψsi will be zero.

















. We keep track of the past states, S
0
t−1, because some of
the observables in the measurement equation below will appear in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Then, we
write to the observation equation:
Y

















0 + Ψo3 (7)
where Ψo1 and Ψo3 1×48 matrices and Ψo2 is a 48×48 matrix.
W h i l et h el a wo fm o t i o nf o rs t a t e si su n i q u e( o ra tl e a s te q u i v a l e n tt oac l a s so fd i ﬀerent
states, all of which have the same implications for the dynamics of the model), the observation
20equation depends on what we assume the researcher actually observes. In our case, we have
chosen the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the relative price of investment, output, hours, inﬂation, and the
federal funds rate. Unfortunately, we do not know much about the right choice of observables
and how they may aﬀect our estimation results (for one of the few articles on this topic, see
Boivin and Giannoni, 2006).
4.7. The Likelihood Function
Equations (6) and (7) constitute the state space representation of our model. One convenient
properties of this representation is that we can exploit it to evaluate the likelihood of a DSGE




, is the probability that the






Note that Φ1 is not included in Ψ because it is a function of the other parameters in the




, we can estimate Ψ by maximizing the
likelihood or by combining it with a prior density for the model parameter to form a posterior
distribution.




? Given the Markov structure of our state
































If we know St,c o m p u t i n gL(Yt|St;Ψ) is relatively easy. Conditional on St, the measure-
ment equation (7) is a change of variables from εt to YT. Hence, we can apply the change
of variable formula to evaluate the required probabilities. Similarly, if we know S0,w ec a n
employ (6) and the measurement equation (7) to compute L(Y1|S0;Ψ). Consequently, knowl-
edge of the sequence {p(St|Yt−1;Ψ)}
T




.E v a l -
uating (or at least drawing from) p(S0;Ψ) is usually straightforward, although often costly
(Santos and Peralta-Alva, 2005). The diﬃculty is to characterize the sequence of conditional
distributions {p(St|Yt−1;Ψ)}
T
t=1 and to compute the integrals in (8).
21An algorithm for doing so (but not the only one!; see the technical appendix to Fernández-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2007, for alternatives and references) is to use a simulation
technique known as the particle ﬁlter. Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2005 and
2007) have shown that the particle ﬁlter can be successfully applied to the estimation of
nonlinear and/or non-normal DSGE models. The particle ﬁlter is a sequential Monte Carlo
method that replaces the {p(St|Yt−1;Ψ)}
T
t=1 by an empirical distribution of draws generated
by simulation. The bit of magic of the particle ﬁlter is that the simulation is generated through
a procedure known as sequential importance resampling (SIR). SIR guarantees that the Monte
Carlo method achieves suﬃcient accuracy in a reasonable amount of time, something that
cannot be achieved without resampling (Arulampalam et al., 2002). The appendix describes
in further detail the working of the particle ﬁlter.
4.8. A Bayesian Approach
We will confront our model with the data using Bayesian methods. The Bayesian paradigm
is a powerful and ﬂexible perspective for the estimation of DSGE models (see the survey by
An and Schorfheide, 2006). First, Bayesian analysis is a coherent approach to inference based
on a clear set of axioms. Second, the Bayesian approach handles in a natural way misspec-
iﬁcation and lack of identiﬁcation, both serious concerns in the estimation of DSGE models
(Canova and Sala, 2006). Moreover, it has desirable small sample and asymptotic properties,
even when evaluated by classical criteria (Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2004).
Third, priors are a ﬂexible procedure to introduce presample information and to reduce the
dimensionality problem associated with the number of parameters. This property will be
especially attractive in our application, since parameter drifting will increase the practical
number of dimensions of our model.
















The posterior summarizes the uncertainty regarding the parameters, and it can be used for
point estimation. For example, under a quadratic loss function, our point estimates will be
the mean of the posterior.
Since the posterior is also diﬃcult to characterize, we generate draws from it using a
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. We use the resulting empirical distribution to obtain point
estimates, variances, etc. We describe this algorithm in the appendix.
225. Parameter Drifting
Now we are ready to deal with parameter drifting. Since the extension to other cases of
parameter variation is rather straightforward, we present only one example of drift within
our model.
Motivated by the ﬁrst example in section 3, we will investigate the situation where the



























Note the diﬀerence with the speciﬁcation in (5): in the new equation the elasticities of the




are indexed by time.
We will postulate that the parameters follow an AR(1) in logs to ensure that the parameter
is positive:
logγRt =m i n
©
(1 − ρR)logγR + ρR logγRt−1 + εRt,0
ª
(10)





logγy + ρy logγyt−1 + εyt (12)
where {εRt,εΠt,εyt} are i.i.d. normal shocks and Q is a 3 × 3 matrix of covariances.2 We
allow for arbitrary correlation in the innovations, since it is plausible that the reasons why
the monetary authority becomes more (less) responsive to inﬂa t i o na r et h es a m er e a s o n si t
will become less (more) responsive to the growth gap. Also, we could generalize the changes
in parameters by allowing changes in Π or in the variance of mt (R and Λyd are not chosen
by the monetary authority but they are implied by the other parameters of the model and
by Π). Finally, we impose the stability condition that the smoothing coeﬃcient γRt must be
less than 1 in levels (or less than 0 in logs).
Our speciﬁcation of parameter drift emphasizes the continuity of the change process, in
opposition to the discrete changes in the parameters captured by a Markov-switching process
(see Davig and Leeper, 2006a and 2006b). We do not have a strong prior preference for one
version or the other. We like our speciﬁcation because it is parsimonious and easy to handle,





and the matrix Q become in this formulation the new “struc-
tural parameters.” We are also skeptical about their true structural nature, but to avoid the inﬁnite regression
problem, we will ignore our doubts for the moment.
23economy.
According to our favorite interpretation of parameter drifting, we will assume that agents
understand that policy evolves over time following (10)-(12). Consequently, they react to it
and make their decisions based on the current values of γt a n do nt h ef a c tt h a tγt will evolve
over time.
T h ed r i f to ft h ep a r a m e t e r si m p l i e st h a tt h ee c o n o m yw i l lt r a v e lt h r o u g hz o n e sw h e r et h e
Taylor principle is not satisﬁed. However, this may not necessarily mean that the equilibrium
is not unique. In the context of Markov-regime changes in the coeﬃcients of the Taylor rule,
Davig and Leeper (2006a) have developed what they call the generalized Taylor principle.
Davig and Leeper argue that a unique equilibrium survives if the Taylor rule is suﬃciently
active when the economy is in the active policy regime or if the expected length of time
the economy will be in the nonactive policy regime is suﬃciently small. To keep this paper
focused, we will not dwell on generating results equivalent to Davig and Leeper’s in our
environment. Suﬃce it to say that one further advantage of the Bayesian approach is that
we can handle restrictions on the parameter drifting with the use of the priors. For example,
we can implement a reﬂecting boundary on (10) by putting a zero prior on the possibility of
violating that boundary. Also, in our empirical analysis, we estimate γΠ as being bigger than
one. This suggests that the Taylor principle will be satisﬁed, at least on average.
Our formulation of parameter drifting has one important drawback: we do not model
explicitly why the parameters change over time. In section 3, we discussed that changes
in the policy parameters could be a reﬂection of changing political priorities or evolving
perceptions about the eﬀectiveness of policy. A more complete model would include explicit
mechanisms through which we discipline the movement of the parameters over time. Many of
those mechanisms can be incorporated into our framework, since we are rather ﬂexible with
the type of functional forms for the parameter drift that we can handle.
The model in section 4 carries on except with the modiﬁcation of (9) and the fact that all
the conditional expectations now incorporate the process (10). Thus, the states of the model
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w h e r ew eh a v ei n c l u d e dγRt,γΠt, and γyt as three additional states. We will follow the
convention of separating drifting parameters from the other states with a “;” since they
are an object of interest by themselves. Similarly, we apply the particle ﬁlter to evaluate the
likelihood of the model and the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to simulate from the posterior.
246. Empirical Analysis
This section presents our empirical analysis. First, we report the point estimates of the model
when we keep all parameters ﬁxed over the sample. This estimation sets a natural benchmark
for the rest of the study. Second, we discuss the results of an exercise where we allow the
parameters of the Taylor rule of the monetary authority to change over time. Third, we
analyze the evolution of the parameters that control the level of price and wage rigidities. In
the interest of space, we select these two exercises as particularly illustrative of the procedure
we propose. However, we could have performed many other exercises within the framework
of our methodology.
We estimate the model using ﬁve time series for the U.S.: 1) the relative price of investment
with respect to the price of consumption, 2) real output per capita growth, 3) hours worked
per capita, 4) the CPI and 5) the federal funds rate. Our sample goes from 1955:Q1 to
2000:Q4. We stop our sample at the end of 2000 because of the absence of good information
on the relative price of investment after that time. To make the observed series compatible
with the model, we compute both real output and real gross investment in consumption
units. For that purpose, we use the relative price of investment deﬁned as the ratio of an
investment deﬂator and a deﬂator for consumption. The consumption deﬂator is constructed
from the deﬂa t o r so fn o n d u r a b l eg o o d sa n ds e r v i c e sr e p o r t e di nt h eN I P A .S i n c et h eN I P A
investment deﬂators are poorly measured, we rely on the investment deﬂator constructed by
Fisher (2006), a series that ends at 2000:Q4. The appendix provides further information on
the construction of the data.
6.1. Point Estimation
Before reporting results, we specify priors for the model’s parameters. We adopt ﬂat priors
for all parameters. We impose boundary constraints only to make the priors proper and
to rule out parameter values that are either incompatible with the model (i.e., a negative
value for a variance, Calvo parameters outside the unit interval) or implausible (the response
to inﬂation in the Taylor rule being bigger than 100). The looseness of such constraints
is shown by the fact that the simulations performed below never travel even close to the
bounds. Also, we ﬁx four parameters, {υ,φ,Φ2,δ}. The parameter controlling money demand
υ is irrelevant for equilibrium dynamics because the government will supply as much money
as required to implement the nominal interest rate determined by the Taylor rule. We ﬁx
the parameter φ t oz e r o ,s i n c ew ed on o th a v ei n f o r m a t i o no np u r ep r o ﬁts by ﬁrms (in the
absence of entry/exit of ﬁrms, there are no serious implications for equilibrium dynamics).
The parameter of the investment adjustment cost, Φ2, is set to 0.001 and depreciation, δ,t o
250.0149 because they are diﬃcult to identify. Our choice of δ matches the capital-output ratio
in the data (remember that in our model we have both physical depreciation, controlled by
δ, and economic depreciation induced by the change in the relative price of capital).
Our choice of ﬂat priors is motivated by the observation that, with this prior, the posterior
is proportional to the likelihood function.3 Consequently, our Bayesian results can be inter-
preted as a classical exercise where the mode of the likelihood function (the point estimate
under an absolute value loss function for estimation) is the maximum likelihood estimate.
Moreover, a researcher who prefers more informative priors can always reweight the draws
from the posterior to accommodate his favorite priors (Geweke, 1998).4 We repeated our
estimation with an informative prior without ﬁnding important diﬀerences in the results.
Table 6.1 summarizes our results by reporting the mean and the standard deviation of the
posterior.5 Most of our point estimates coincide with the typical ﬁndings of other estimation
exercises and the standard deviations are small. Hence, we comment only on a few of them.
We have a high degree of habit persistence, h is 0.88, and we have a Frisch elasticity of labor
supply of 0.74 (1/1.36), well within the bounds of ﬁndings in the recent microeconomic liter-
ature (Browning, Hansen, and Heckman, 1999). The estimates of elasticities of substitution
ε and η are around 8, implying average mark-ups of around 14 percent.
[TABLE 6.1 HERE]
The Calvo parameter for price adjustment, θp, is a relatively high 0.91, while the indexa-
tion level χp, is 0.15. It is tempting to compare our estimates with the microeconomic evidence
on the average duration of prices (Bils and Klenow, 2004, or Nakamura and Steinsson, 2006).
However, the comparison is diﬃcult because we have partial indexation: prices change every
quarter for all producers, a fraction θp because producers reoptimize and a fraction 1 − θp
because of indexation. The Calvo parameter for wage adjustment, θw, is 0.45, while the
indexation, χw, is 0.85. Our point estimates imply stronger nominal rigidities in price than
in wages, in line with Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005) or Galí and Rabanal (2004) but





are quite standard. The Fed smooths the interest
rate over time (γR is estimated to be 0.79), and responds actively to inﬂation (γR is 1.25)
3There is a small qualiﬁer: the bounded support of the priors. We can ﬁx this small diﬀerence by thinking
about those bounds as frontiers of admissible parameter values in a classical perspective.
4We do not argue that our ﬂat priors are uninformative. After a reparameterization of the model, a ﬂat
prior may become highly curved. Moreover, if we wanted to use the model for other purposes like forecasting
or to compare it with, for example, a VAR, we would need to elicit our priors more carefully.
5A word of caution here: the estimates of the standard deviation with the particle ﬁlter are relatively un-
stable (Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2007, and DeJong et al., 2007). Computational constraints
preclude us from running a simulation suﬃciently long to fully avoid this problem.
26and weakly to the output growth gap (γy is 0.19). We estimate that the Fed has a target for
quarterly inﬂation of 0.78 percent (or around 3 percent yearly).
The growth rates of the investment-speciﬁc technological change, Λμ, and of the neutral
technology, ΛA, imply that most of the growth in the U.S. economy (83 percent) is induced
by improvements in the capital-producing technology. This result corroborates the impor-
tance of modelling biased technological change for understanding growth and ﬂuctuations
that Greenwood, Herkowitz, and Krusell (1997 and 2000) have so forcefully defended. The
estimated long-run growth rate of the economy, (ΛA + αΛμ)/(1 − α) is 0.4 percent per quar-
ter, or 1.6 percent annually, roughly the observed mean in the sample. Also, the standard
deviation σμ is much higher than σA.
Our estimation serves diﬀerent roles. First, it validates our model as a promising labora-
tory for our exercises with parameter drifting. Since in the benchmark case we obtain results
compatible with the literature and with the basic growth properties of the U.S. economy,
we know that the results with parameter drifting will indeed come from that feature of the
estimation. Second, we use our point estimates to initialize the parameters in the exercises
with parameter drifting.
In the next two subsections, we will report our ﬁndings when we allow one parameter
to vary at a time. We do this for convenience. First, allowing several parameters to move
simultaneously makes the computation and estimation of the model much more costly. Sec-
ond, the information in the sample is limited, and it is diﬃcult to obtain stable estimates
otherwise. Third, especially in our second exercise, our objective is not so much to have the
richest possible model to ﬁt the data well but to show that as soon as you let parameters
change over time, strong signs of misspeciﬁcation appear. We will continue the exploration
of joint moves of parameters in the near future.
6.2. Evolution of Policy Parameters
Our ﬁrst exercise studies the evolution of the policy parameters in the Taylor rule. This
investigation evaluates how much evidence there is in the data of a changing monetary policy
over time. As we discussed in section 3, the literature has extensively debated the topic
(Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000, Cogley and Sargent, 2001, Lubick and Schorfheide, 2004,
Sims and Zha, 2006, Boivin, 2006, just to cite some papers). However, the empirical methods
applied so far are unsatisfactory because they rely either on divisions of the sample that do
not let the agents in the model forecast the changes in policy or on the estimation of reduced
forms.
Arguably, the most interesting parameter is γΠt−1, since this parameter controls how
27aggressively the monetary authority responds to inﬂation. In addition, γΠt−1 is intimately
linked with the issue of multiplicity of equilibria and the possibility of monetary policy being
a source of instability. Figure 6.2.1 plots our point estimate of the evolution of γΠt−1 over time
plus the two standard deviations interval to gauge the uncertainty present in the estimation.
We report the smoothed values of γΠt−1 using the whole sample (Godsill, Doucet, and West,
2004). We ﬁnd it convenient, for expositional purposes, to eliminate some of the quarter-to-
quarter variation of the parameter. To accomplish this goal, in ﬁgure 6.2.2, we graph the
trend of the change of the parameter where we compute the trend using a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter. We emphasize that this trend is only a device to read the graph more clearly and lacks
a formal statistical interpretation.
In both ﬁgures 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, γΠt−1 starts low, slightly above 1 during the 1950s, 1960s,
and early 1970s, with periods when it was even below 1. However, in the mid-1970s, and
especially after Volcker’s appointment as chairman of the Board of Governors, γΠt−1 soared.
T h er e s p o n s et oi n ﬂation reached its peak in the early 1980s, where it was as high as 6 in one
quarter. After that maximum, γΠt−1 slowly decreases during the 1990s, perhaps reﬂecting the
Fed’s more permissive attitude to accommodate the strong productivity growth associated
with the Internet boom.
Since our model has parameter drifting, it is not straightforward to compare these numbers
with estimates obtained in ﬁxed-parameter models. However, we clearly conﬁrm the ﬁndings
of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), Lubick and Schorfheide (2004), and Boivin (2006) that
monetary policy has become much more active in the last 25 years. Our ﬁnding is also
consistent with the results of ﬁgure 12 in Cogley and Sargent (2001), where they trace the
evolution of the activism coeﬃcient as measured by a parameter-drifting VAR.
Another parameter of importance is the inﬂation target of the monetary authority, Π.
Histories like those in Taylor (1998), Sargent (1999), or Primiceri (2006) explain that the
inﬂation target may have changed over time as a reﬂection of the Fed’s varying beliefs about
the trade-oﬀ between unemployment and inﬂation. Figure 6.2.3 plots the evolution of the
target over time plus the two standard deviation interval. From the start of the sample until
the early 1970s and, later, for the 1990s, Π hovers around 1.004 or, in annual terms, around
1.6 percent. This number is close to the informal target or comfort zone that describes the
Fed’s behavior according to many commentators. During the intermediate years, the inﬂation
target increases, reﬂecting perhaps the views the Fed had about the possibility of exploiting
the Phillips curve or illustrating the information lags regarding the changing features of the
economy emphasized by Orphanides (2002). We ﬁnd intriguing the similarity of ﬁgure 6.2.3 to
Romer and Romer’s (2002) hypothesis, based on narrative accounts and internal Greenbook
forecasts of the Fed, that monetary policy in the U.S. has gone through a long cycle of
28moderation, aggressiveness, and renewed temperance.
Our estimates of the evolution of the inﬂation target provide a reality check on our pro-
cedure. In ﬁgure 6.2.4, we plot the inﬂation target versus realized inﬂation. If the estimation
is working properly, part of the variation in the inﬂation target needs to be accounted for,
in a purely mechanical fashion, by changes in inﬂation. That is precisely what we observe:
as inﬂation increases and then falls during the late 1960s and the 1970s, the target inﬂation
estimated goes up and down.
Note, however, that the inﬂation target ﬂuctuates roughly between 40 and 50 percent
less than inﬂation. In particular during the 1970s, the inﬂation target is well below actual
inﬂation. This diﬀerence is accounted in two ways. First, by the form of our Taylor rule. We
a s s u m et h a to n ei n p u ti n t ot h er u l ei st h eg r o w t hg a pb e t w e e nt h eg r o w t ho fo u t p u tyd
t/yd
t−1
and the long-run growth rate of the economy Λyd. The 1970s were years of very low growth
in comparison with Λyd.6 Thus, our model interprets the behavior of the Fed as lowering the
interest rates as a response to low output growth in exchange for higher inﬂation. Second, our
model backs up large negative technology shocks in the 1970s that push inﬂation above the
target level. Hence, an alternative way to think about this result is that our model suggests
that the big rise in inﬂation during the 1970s had less to do with changes in the inﬂation
target than with a series of unfavorable aggregate shocks.
We summarize our results. First, the Fed’s response towards inﬂation became more ag-
gressive in the late 1970s and early 1980s and has stayed high since then with perhaps a small
fall. Second, the inﬂation target was relaxed in the 1970s but not enough to account for the
high inﬂation of that decade. We trust our results not only because they come from the
estimation of a coherent DSGE model, but also because they are consistent with the ﬁndings
of the existing literature that uses alternative estimation procedures, with narrative accounts
of monetary policy, and with the reality check explained above.
6.3. Evolution of Price and Wage Rigidities





. These four parameters generate the nominal rigidity in the econ-
omy required to match the impulse response functions documented by VARs (Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).
Given their importance in the model, it is unfortunate that these parameters have only
a tenuous link with microeconomic foundations. Even if the Calvo adjustment probabilities
6This observation may have motivated a model where Λyd changes over time, but such models are, as
argued by Bansal and Yaron (2004), quite diﬃcult to estimate in small samples.
29are the reduced form of a convex adjustment cost model, the environment that produces
this reduced form has changed over the years in our sample. We have gone from periods
of high inﬂation and low response of the monetary authority to rising prices to periods of
much lower inﬂation and a more aggressive attitude toward inﬂation by the Fed. Moreover,
the U.S. economy has experienced a notable level of deregulation, increasing competition in
internal markets from international trade, and lower unionization rates. The justiﬁcation of
the indexation parameters or their relation to the Calvo adjustment probabilities is even less
clear. Why do agents index their prices and wages? And if they do, to which quantity? Past
inﬂation? Current inﬂation? Steady-state inﬂation? Wage inﬂation? Consequently, it is




drift over time, both
as a measure of how strong nominal rigidities have been in each diﬀerent moment and as a
tool to assess the extent of possible misspeciﬁcation of the model along this dimension.
As in the case of policy parameters, we specify an AR(1) as the law of motion for the
parameters:
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are i.i.d. normal shocks and where we take the minimum of the
value of the parameter induced by the autoregressive component and 0 to be sure that the
parameters are less than 1 in levels (they will always be more than 0 because we are taking
logs).
We report ﬁrst the experiment where we let θpt, the Calvo parameter of price changes,
evolve over time. We ﬁnd it more informative (and more directly comparable to the mi-
cro evidence) to report the average duration of the spell before the producers reoptimize,
1(/1 − θpt), in quarter terms. Figure 6.3.1 plots that duration while ﬁgure 6.3.2 plots the
HP-trend and, for comparison purposes, the HP-trend of the CPI. In this ﬁgure, as in all the
rest of the ﬁgures of the paper where we plot two diﬀerent variables, we follow the convention
that the continuous line represents the parameter on the left y-axis and the discontinuous
one the parameter on the right y-axis.7
7We do not plot the standard deviations interval for the average price duration (neither later for the
average wage duration) because the transformation 1(/1 − θpt) generates implausibly large upper bounds as
soon as the simulation of θpt travels close to 1. The standard deviations interval for θpt show, however, that
30Figures 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 reveal a clear pattern: average duration was high in the late 1950s,
dropped quickly in the 1960s, and only startedt op i c ku pi nt h el a t e1 9 7 0 s ,c o n t i n u i n gw i t h
an upward trend until today. Interestingly enough, the changes in the average duration of
the spell before the producers reoptimize are strongly correlated with changes in inﬂation.
In ﬁgure 6.3.2 we see how times of increasing trend inﬂation (late 1960s, 1970s) are times of
falling average duration and vice versa: how times of decreasing trend inﬂation (the 1980s
and the 1990s) are times of increasing average duration.
Our second experiment regarding price rigidities is with χpt, the parameter that controls
price indexation. Figure 6.3.3 plots the evolution of the parameter over the sample plus the
two standard deviation interval and ﬁgure 6.3.4 its HP-trend (again, with the HP-trend of
the CPI superimposed). Indexation evolves in an opposite way to price duration: it starts
low in the 1950s and 1960s but rises very strongly during the late 1960s. Then, it drops
dramatically in the mid-1970s and stays low over the next 20 years (except for a temporary
increase in the early 1980s). In the last part of the sample, during the 1990s, χpt steadily
d r o p s .T h ed r o pi ni n d e x a t i o ni nt h es e c o n dh a l fo ft h e1 9 7 0 sm a yb ea c c o u n t e df o rb yﬁrms
switching to more often optimal price adjustments and less automatic pricing rules. Firms
were perhaps induced by the volatile inﬂation of those years, which made partial indexation
a costly option. Mechanically, our estimation ﬁnds less indexation because inﬂation is less
persistent in the 1970s.
We ﬁnd it illuminating to combine the evolution of the Calvo parameter θpt and of index-
ation χpt.W ed os oi nﬁgure 6.3.5 (for their levels) and in ﬁgure 6.3.6 (for their HP-trends).
The comparison of both parameters shows that periods of high price rigidities are also periods
of low indexation. The converse is true as well, except for the mid-1970s. This result points
out that adding indexation as an ad hoc procedure to increase the level of inﬂation inertia
may hide important dynamics in price adjustments.
We repeat our two experiments for wages. Figure 6.3.7 (in levels) and ﬁgure 6.3.8 (in HP-
trends, with inﬂation superimposed) plot the evolution of the average duration of the spell
before workers reoptimize wages, 1(/1 − θwt), in quarter terms. In this case the evidence is
more diﬃcult to interpret, with a big spike in the second half of the 1980s which is probably
due to sampling uncertainty. However, it is still the case that, during the 1970s, as inﬂation
went up, wage rigidity went down, and as inﬂation was tamed in the early 1980s, wages again
became more rigid.
Figures 6.3.9 and 6.3.10 draw the evolution of wage indexation. Here, in comparison, the
clarity of the result is embarrassing: wage indexation is nearly the perfect mirror of inﬂation.
the parameter itself is estimated without too much uncertainty.
31As we did for prices, we interpret this ﬁnding as the natural consequence of workers switching
to more often wage reoptimizations that make indexation less of an interesting rule in times of
high inﬂation.8 Less wage indexation is what the model needs to capture the higher volatility
of inﬂation in the data.
For completeness, we ﬁnish our graphical display with ﬁgures 6.3.11 to 6.3.16, where we
plot the evolution of the diﬀerent parameters controlling nominal rigidities against others.
Because of space constraints, we refrain from further discussion of the plots. However, the
reader can appreciate that the similarity in the evolution of the parameters over time solidiﬁes
our conﬁdence that we are uncovering a systematic pattern of relationships between nominal
rigidities and inﬂation.
We consider our ﬁndings to be strong proof of the changing nature of the nominal rigidities
in the economy and of a strong indication of model misspeciﬁcation along the dimension of
price and wage adjustment. Calvo’s price adjustment cannot capture the evolution of the
fundamentals that determine the pricing decisions of ﬁrms and households. Our results
underscore that this problem is relevant empirically. Also, they suggest that the evidence
in Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) that the intensive margin of price changes accounts for 95
percent of the monthly variance of inﬂation may be a product of the sample period (1988-
2003), where the low level of inﬂation limits identiﬁcation because it eliminates the source of
variation of the data. Indeed, in our ﬁgures 6.3.5 and 6.3.6, if we look at the period 1988-2000,
we observe less variation in the pricing parameters.
There are at least two possible sources for this misspeciﬁcation of the pricing mechanism
of the model that could rationalize our ﬁndings. First, time-varying price and wage rigidity
parameters may be revealing a problem of omitted variables. For example, a change in the
probability of price adjustment translates into a diﬀerent slope of the (implicit) Phillips curve
in our model and thus, into a variation of inﬂation. However, in the data, there are other
shocks that aﬀect inﬂation, like the price of energy, the price of commodities, or exchange
rate ﬂuctuations. Since we do not include these shocks, we may be capturing the changing
inﬂuence of these sources of inﬂation through variations in the Calvo parameters.9
8During the early 1970s, there was a raise in the prevalence of cost-of-living allowance (COLA) escalators
in collective bargaining agreements (Hendricks and Kahn, 1985). This observation could be used to undermine
our result. However, even at their peak, COLAs only covered 6 million workers, a small percentage of the
labor force. Moreover, it is diﬃcult to map COLAs from the 1970s into our model, since they had many
contingent rules that make them quite diﬀerent from the naïve indexation rules that we use. In fact, it could
even be possible to think about a state-contingent COLA as an implicit form of reoptimization.
9Similarly, part of the variation in the Calvo parameters may be accounted for by mark-up shocks, which
play an important role in models like Smets and Wouters’ (2003). However, it is diﬃcult to see which type of
mark-up shocks will have the level of persistence that we observe in the movements of the Calvo parameters
that we estimate.
32The second source of misspeciﬁcation may be the time-dependent structure of pricing
(either àl aCalvo as in the model we have presented or àl aTaylor). Thus, we can read our
results as favoring models of state-dependent pricing (Caballero and Engel, 1993, Caplin and
Leahy, 1991 and 1997), since those have an endogenously changing duration of prices and
wages. The extra analytical diﬃculty implied by state-dependent models (Dotsey, King, and
Wolman, 1999) may be a price we are forced to pay. Another strand of the literature that may
consider our results interesting is the one that deals with sticky information (Mankiw and
Reiss, 2002, and Sims, 2002). Higher inﬂation increases the incentives to gather information
and, hence, it is likely to imply more frequent price and wage adjustments.
Finally, our ﬁndings have relevant implications for optimal policy design. First, if we
interpret the evolution of parameters like θpt as exogenously given, it may be something that
the monetary authority may condition its behavior on (we do not enter into a discussion
of how it would estimate them in real time, we only raise this as a theoretical possibility).
Second, if we read our results as showing that the measured amount of price rigidities are
endogenous to monetary policy, optimal design becomes tougher than in the basic Ramsey
exercises.
7. Conclusion
How structural are the structural parameters of DSGE models? Less so than we often claim.
Our analysis indicates that there are large variations in the estimated values of several of
the key parameters of a benchmark medium-scale macroeconomic model during our sample
period.
We document changes in the response of the monetary authority to inﬂation and in the
inﬂation target that conﬁrm previous ﬁndings by other researchers. In particular, we report a
move by the Fed toward a much more aggressive stand against raising prices in the late 1970s.
Also, we ﬁnd that changes in the inﬂation target account, at most, for 40-50 percent of the
increase in inﬂation in the 1970s. Our results are remarkable because they are derived in a
context where agents understand that policy evolves over time and respond to that evolution.
We uncover that the parameters controlling nominal rigidities drift in a substantial way,
and more important, are strongly correlated with inﬂation. These ﬁndings cast serious doubts
on the usefulness of models based on Calvo pricing and invite deeper investigations of state-
dependent pricing models.
We do not want our work to be interpreted as a sweeping criticism of the estimation of
DSGE models, because it is not. The literature has made impressive progress over the last
years and has contributed much to improving our understanding of aggregate ﬂuctuations
33and the eﬀects of economic policy. We ourselves have been engaged in this research agenda
and plan to continue doing so. We hope, instead, that our paper will be read as an invitation
to further estimation of DSGE models with parameter drifting. This avenue is promising,
both as a mechanism for incorporating richer dynamics and as a diagnostic tool for detecting
gross misspeciﬁcations.
In fact, as our discussants have rightly pointed out, much remains to be done. We have
only scratched the surface of the problem of estimating DSGE models with parameter drifting.
We have not explored the model when we have diﬀerent sources of variations in the parameters
at the same time or when there is stochastic volatility in the shocks. Also, we have not
studied the consequences of drifting parameters for the dynamics of the business cycle or
for the impulse-response functions of the model. Finally, we have not evaluated diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of parameter drift or analyzed the possible reasons for parameter drifting in
detail.
Our skepticism about the structural nature of most “structural” parameters is not a call
to perform reduced-form exercises. Along with Tom Sargent and Mark Watson (Fernández-
Villaverde et al., 2007), we have singled out some of the problems of estimating reduced-
form models. But there are many other papers emphasizing the weaknesses of reduced-form
inference, too many indeed to even bother with a list. The fundamental point is that every
empirical procedure has strengths and limitations. As Hurwicz (1962) warned us many years
ago, just because we name something “structural,” we should not believe we have taken the
theoretical high-ground.
8. Appendix
This appendix oﬀers further details about the technical aspects of the paper. First, we discuss
some general computational aspects and elaborate on the solution of the model. Second, we
describe the particle ﬁlter that evaluates the likelihood function of the model. Third, we
comment on the estimation procedure. Fourth, we close with the details of the construction
of the data.
8.1. Computation of the Model
The most important feature of the algorithm to be described below to solve and estimate the
model is that it can be implemented on a good desktop computer. We coded all programs for
the perturbation of the model and the particle ﬁlter in Fortran 95 and compiled them in Intel
Visual Fortran 9.1 to run on Windows-based machines (except some Mathematica programs
34to generate analytic derivatives). We use a Xeon Processor 5160 EMT64 at 3.00 GHz with
16 GB of RAM.
The solution of the model is challenging becausew eh a v e1 9s t a t ev a r i a b l e sp l u st h ed r i f t i n g
parameters that we allow in each empirical exercise. Moreover, we need to recompute the
solution of the model for each new set of parameter values in the estimation. The only
non-linear procedure that accomplishes this computation in a reasonable amount of time is
perturbation (Aruoba, Fernández-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramírez, 2006). We implement our
solution by perturbing the equilibrium conditions of the rescaled version of the model (i.e.,
the one where we have already eliminated the two unit roots) around the deterministic steady
state. This means that the solution is locally accurate regardless of the level of technology in
the economy. Also, note that the steady state will depend on the level of inﬂation targeted
by the monetary authority.
We use Mathematica to compute the analytical derivatives and to generate Fortran 95
code with the corresponding analytical expression. Then, we load that output into a Fortran
95 code that evaluates the solution of the model for each parameter value as implied by the



































where, recalling our notation, St are the states, εt are the shocks, Jt is a vector of variables
of interest in the model that are not states, and the Γsi’ sa r em a t r i c e so ft h er i g h ts i z e .W i t h






























































8.2. Description of the Particle Filter
We provide now a short description of the particle ﬁlter. We will deliberately focus on the
intuition of the procedure and we will gloss over many technical issues that are relevant for
a successful application of the ﬁlter. We direct the interested reader to Fernández-Villaverde
and Rubio-Ramírez (2007), where we discuss most of those issues in detail, and the articles
in Doucet, de Freitas, and Gordon (2001), which present improved sequential Monte Carlo
algorithms, like Pitts and Shephard’s (1999) auxiliary particle ﬁlter.
35As we described in the main text, given the Markov structure of our state space repre-
































Consequently, if we had the sequence {p(St|Yt−1;Ψ)}
T
t=1 and p(S0;Ψ), we could evaluate
the likelihood of the model. Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005) show conditions under which
we can draw the numerical solution of the model to approximate p(S0;Ψ).T h e t w o d i ﬃ-
culties of evaluation (14) are then to characterize the sequence of conditional distributions
{p(St|Yt−1;Ψ)}
T
t=1 and to compute the diﬀerent integrals in the expression.









from the sequence {p(St|Yt−1;Ψ)}
T
t=1 , we can appeal to a law of large






























where our notation for the draws indicates in the subindex the conditioning set (i.e., t|t − 1
means a draw at moment t conditional on information until t−1) and the superindex denotes
t h ei n d e xo ft h ed r a w . T h ei n t u i t i o no ft h ep r o c e d u r ei st h a tw es u b s t i t u t et h ee x a c tb u t
unknown sequence {p(St|Yt−1;Ψ)}
T
t=1 by its empirical counterpart.
H o wd ow ed r a wf r o m{p(St|Yt−1;Ψ)}
T
t=1? The second key idea of the particle ﬁlter is
that we can extend importance sampling (Geweke, 1989) to a sequential environment. The



































i=1 is a draw from p(St|Yt;Ψ).













from p(St|Yt;Ψ). This result is crucial. It allows us to incorporate
the information in Yt to change our current estimate of St.T h i si sw h yt h i ss t e pi sk n o w n
in ﬁltering theory as update (the discerning reader has probably already realized that this
update is nothing more than an application of Bayes’ theorem).
The resampling step is key for the success of the ﬁlter. A naïve extension of Monte Carlo








without stopping period by
period to resample according to proposition 1. Unfortunately, this naïve scheme diverges.
The reason is that all the sequences become arbitrarily far away from the true sequence of
states, which is a zero measure set and the sequence that is closer to the true states dominates
all the remaining ones in weight. A simple simulation shows that the degeneracy appears

















¢0 are normally distributed. Then, we ap-
ply the law of motion for states that relates the si








This step, known as forecast, put us back at the beginning of proposition 1, but with the
diﬀerence that we have moved forward one period in our conditioning.
The following pseudocode summarizes the description of the algorithm:



















, the law of
motion for states and the distribution of shocks εt.























.I f t<T set t Ã t +1 a n dg ot o
step 1. Otherwise stop.






























37and get an estimate of the likelihood of the model. Del Moral and Jacod (2002) and Künsch
(2005) show weak conditions under which the right-hand side of the previous equation is a




and a central limit theorem applies.
8.3. Estimation Procedure











is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to characterize. However, we can draw from it and build its
empirical counterpart using a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The algorithm is as follows:
Step 0, Initialization: Set i Ã 0 and an initial Ψi. Solve the model for Ψi





with (15). Set i Ã i +1 .
Step 1, Proposal draw: G e tad r a wΨ∗






Step 2, Solving the Model: Solve the model for Ψ∗
i and build the new state
space representation.















i, otherwise Ψi = Ψi−1.
Step 5, Iteration: If i<M, set i Ã i +1 and go to step 1. Otherwise stop.
This algorithm requires us to specify a proposal density q(·,·).W e f o l l o w t h e s t a n d a r d
practice and choose a random walk proposal, Ψ∗
i = Ψi−1 + κi, κi ∼ N (0,Σκ),w h e r eΣκ is a
scaling matrix. This matrix is selected to get the appropriate acceptance ratio of proposals
(Roberts, Gelman and Gilks, 1997).
To reduce the “chatter” of the problem, we will keep the innovations in the particle
ﬁlter (i.e., the draws from the exogenous shock distributions and the resampling probabili-
ties) constant across diﬀerent passes of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. As pointed out
by McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989), this is required to achieve stochastic
equicontinuity, and even if this condition is not strictly necessary in a Bayesian framework,
it reduces the numerical variance of the procedure.
388.4. Construction of Data
As we mention in the text, we compute both real output and real gross investment in con-
sumption units to make the observed series compatible with the model. We deﬁne the relative
price of investment as the ratio of the investment deﬂator and the deﬂator for consumption.
The consumption deﬂator is constructed from the deﬂators of nondurable goods and ser-
vices reported in the NIPA. Since the NIPA investment deﬂators are poorly measured, we
use the investment deﬂator constructed by Fisher (2006). For the real output per capita
series, we ﬁrst deﬁne nominal output as nominal consumption plus nominal gross investment.
We deﬁne nominal consumption as the sum of personal consumption expenditures on non-
durable goods and services, national defense consumption expenditures, federal nondefense
consumption expenditures, and state and local government consumption expenditures. We
deﬁne nominal gross investment as the sum of personal consumption expenditures on durable
goods, national defense gross investment, federal government nondefense gross investment,
state and local government gross investment, private nonresidential ﬁx e di n v e s t m e n t ,a n dp r i -
vate residential ﬁxed investment. Per capita nominal output is deﬁned as the ratio between
our nominal output series and the civilian noninstitutional population between 16 and 65.
Since we need to measure real output per capita in consumption units, we deﬂate the series
by the consumption deﬂator. For the real gross investment per capita series, we divide our
above mentioned nominal gross investment series by the civilian noninstitutional population
between 16 and 65 and the consumption deﬂator. Finally, the hours worked per capita series
is constructed with the index of total number of hours worked in the business sector and the
civilian noninstitutional population between 16 and 65. Since our model implies that hours
worked per capita are between 0 and 1, we normalize the observed series of hours worked per
capita such that it is, on average, 0.33.
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43TABLE 6.1: Point Estimates












































Figure 6.2.1: Evolution of Response to Inflation
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Greenspan












Figure 6.2.2: HP-Trend Evolution of Response to Inflation
Volcker
Greenspan











Figure 6.2.3: Evolution of Inflation Target


























Figure 6.3.1: Average Price Duration













Figure 6.3.2: HP−Trend Price Rigidity vs. HP−Trend Inflation

























Figure 6.3.3: Price Indexation










Figure 6.3.4: HP−Trend Price Indexation vs. HP−Trend Inflation























Figure 6.3.5: Price Rigidity vs. Indexation

















Figure 6.3.6: HP−Trend Price Rigidity vs. HP−Trend Indexation


























Figure 6.3.7: Average Wage Duration














Figure 6.3.8: HP−Trend Wage Rigidity versus HP−Trend Inflation
























Figure 6.3.9: Wage Indexation










Figure 6.3.10: HP−Trend Wage Indexation versus HP−Trend Inflation






















Figure 6.3.11: Wage Rigidity vs. Indexation













Figure 6.3.12: HP−Trend Wage Rigidity vs. HP−Trend Indexation













Figure 6.3.13: Price vs. Wage Rigidity













Figure 6.3.14: HP−Trend Price vs. HP−Trend Wage Rigidity













Figure 6.3.15: Price Indexation vs. Wage Indexation















Figure 6.3.16: HP−Trend Price vs. HP−Trend Wage Indexation
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